

Approved For Release 1999/09/28 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500750045-7

STATINT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INFORMATION FROM  
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

CD NO.

COUNTRY COMMUNIST CHINA


DATE OF May 18-24, 1953  
INFORMATION

SUBJECT INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES

DATE DIST. 18 JUN 1953

HOW  
PUBLISHED

NO. OF PAGES

WHERE  
PUBLISHEDSUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.DATE  
PUBLISHED

LANGUAGE

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE  
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 702  
AND 704, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-  
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS  
PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE MONITORED BROADCASTS

CPW REPORT No. 75-A --COMMUNIST CHINA

(May 18 - 24 1953)

SUMMARY

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB		DISTRIBUTION					
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI							

Approved For Release 1999/09/28 : CIA-RDP80-00809A000500750045-7

CONFIDENTIAL

CIA-POLARIS

SECURITY INFORMATION

## SUMMARY

Continued Soviet penetration into Sinkiang is illustrated by reports that Soviet planes are readily available for fighting locusts, upon call from Soviet experts attached to local offices. China's need to adopt superior Soviet techniques and study Russian ideology continues to be stressed, but Sino-Soviet friendship and China's debt to Russia seem deemphasized. Russian leadership is pointed up in the importance attached to the 25 April PRAVDA editorial, but Peking comment pictures Moscow as merely underwriting Chinese and North Korean peace plans. Russia's sincerity is represented as unquestioned even in Western Nations, but U.S. actions are said to show no evidence of a genuine desire for peace.

Stories of widespread hardship suggest that local problems may be forcing Peking to delay closer ideological alignment with Moscow. Work relief, direct food distribution, and loans are instituted in disaster areas: tax relief is granted; and, private merchants are guaranteed a profit in the turnover of native products. In addition to forcing local officials to halt the peasant movement to the cities, city benefactors are pressured into inducing the peasants to return home.

Evidence of dissatisfaction is readily discernible. Youth Corps members are criticized for seeking machine operators' jobs rather than posts in Party administrative offices; elections are staged to eliminate officials out of sympathy with Party aims; teachers are still said to need a social indoctrination; informers' letters are encouraged; and, reports tell of violation of discipline, "unrealistic quotas," and "shortage of responsible personnel." Rural cadres are severely criticized for alienating independent farmers by forcing them to join mutual aid teams and cooperatives, and are charged with hindering production through bureaucratic practices, such as the destruction of plants that were improperly laid out.

Friction between Tibetans and the People's Liberation Army is suggested by repeated emphasis on PLA achievements and the gains accruing to Tibetans. PLA men rigidly observe local customs, it is claimed, "staying away from Lama temples," but Tibetans are warned to overcome their "narrow racial prejudices," and are reminded that Tibet now is "an integral part" of China.

CONFIDENTIAL